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Humans have a tendency to overvalue their own ideas and creations. Understanding
how these errors in judgement emerge is important for explaining suboptimal decisions,
as when individuals and groups choose self-created alternatives over superior or equal
ones. We show that such overvaluation is a reconstructive process that emerges when
participants believe they have created an item, regardless of whether this belief is
true or false. This overvaluation is observed both when false beliefs of self-creation
are elicited (Experiment 1) or implanted (Experiment 2). Using brain imaging data
we highlight the brain processes mediating an interaction between value and belief
of self-creation. Specifically, following the creation manipulation there is an increased
functional connectivity during valuation between the right caudate nucleus, where we
show BOLD activity correlated with subjective value, and the left amygdala, where we
show BOLD activity is linked to subjective belief. Our study highlights psychological and
neurobiological processes through which false beliefs alter human valuation and in doing
so throw light on a common source of error in judgements of value.
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Introduction
Humans value their own creations (e.g., books, ideas, paintings, cupcakes) more highly than
identical—and in some cases superior—products created by others (Franke et al., 2010; Norton
et al., 2012) and believe other people will share their sentiment (Norton et al., 2012). The societal
importance of these errors is that they can lead to suboptimal decision-making in sectors ranging
from finance to health (Norton, 2009); for example, companies can overvalue the products they
develop and physicians can favour objectively inferiormedical procedures developed internally over
superior ones developed elsewhere, the so-called ‘‘Not Invented Here’’ syndrome (Katz and Allen,
1982).
One possibility is that this overvaluation is a reconstructive process wherein a self-enhancing
bias is implemented after the fact. In this case the mere belief1 that an item has been self-created
should be sufficient to alter its value, irrespective of whether that belief is true or false. Indeed, on
a wide range of skills and characteristics humans falsely believe they fare better than most other
individuals and are better than they actually are, also known as the superiority illusion (Alicke et al.,
1995; Dunning et al., 2003). Crucially, these self-enhancing valuations extend to entities associated
1We use the term ‘‘belief’’ as per its Oxford dictionary definition; ‘‘an acceptance that a statement
is true or that something exists’’.
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with the self, including romantic partners (Murray, 1999),
offspring (Weinstein, 1980), groups (Brewer, 1979), possessions
(Nesselroade et al., 1999; Morewedge et al., 2009) and most
relevant to the present study, self-created objects. The latter is
known as the ‘‘Ikea effect’’ (Norton et al., 2012) or ‘‘I designed
it myself’’ effect (Franke et al., 2010). While the existence
of these biases has been extensively documented (Franke and
Schreier, 2010; Franke et al., 2010; Mochon et al., 2012; Norton
et al., 2012; Dohle et al., 2014; Kang and Lee, 2015), the
cognitive and neural mechanisms by which overvaluation occurs
is unknown.
Here, we examine whether this phenomenon is a result
of a reconstructive process whereby a mere belief in self-
creation of items—which we both measure and experimentally
manipulate—alters people’s current estimate of the value of those
items, regardless of whether the items are in fact self-created
or not. We will use functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) to identify a BOLD signal that tracks participants’
subjective value of items as well as subjective belief of
creation. Using functional connectivity analysis we can then
test whether and how these signals relate to each other. If
overvaluation of self-created objects is related to an explicit
belief of creation, neural signals indexing subjective belief (as
identified within our task) may show enhanced synchronization
with neural signals tracking value (as identified within our
task) following creation, relative to before. The striatum has
been shown in the past to process value (O’Doherty, 2004;
Delgado, 2007), while subregions of the medial temporal
lobe have been shown to index true and/or false belief
(Eichenbaum et al., 2007; Edelson et al., 2011). Connectivity
between those regions has frequently been associated with the
interplay of decision making and memory (Pennartz et al.,
2011; Wimmer and Shohamy, 2012). Here, we will first
examine if those regions index value and explicit beliefs in
our task, and then test for changes in functional connectivity
between them.
To investigate how beliefs of self-creation are integrated
into evaluation of items, we combined fMRI with a novel
task in which participants evaluated 80 items before and after
creating these pre-designed objects or watching the objects
being created (Experiment 1, Figure 1). As the objects were
pre-designed (equivalent to IKEA furniture) subjects could not
design items according to their own preference. We included
a large number of objects in our task so that subsequently
participants would frequently hold false beliefs in regards
to which items they created themselves and which they
merely watched being created. This allowed us to dissociate
the effect of creating an object from the mere belief in
having created an object on changes in subjective value
and brain activity. In other words, the paradigm enabled us
to examine whether it is crucial that an individual create
an item, or whether the mere belief in being instrumental
in its creation is sufficient for overvaluation to take place,
even when that belief is in fact false. In a second study
(Experiment 2, Figure 2) we tested if beliefs of creation
cause overvaluation by actively manipulating participants’ beliefs
instead of eliciting them.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Twenty-three (Experiment 1) and 30 (Experiment 2) healthy
right-handed participants who provided informed consent took
part in the study. All had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision and no history of mental illness. Participants were
excluded that missed more than 10 value responses (one in
Experiment 1 and four in Experiment 2). Additionally, in
Experiment 1 two participants were excluded for having fewer
than nine trials in at least one condition. This threshold
was determined a priori (Sharot et al., 2004). The exclusion
of the participants did not affect the pattern of the central
behavioral finding (effect of belief: F1,22 = 5.89, p = 0.024;
effect of reality: F1,22 = 0.59, p = 0.81; interaction: F1,22 = 3.17,
p = 0.09). One participant was eliminated due to a technical
error that resulted in loss of partial fMRI data leaving nineteen
participants (nine female; 20–37 years, mean age 23.3 years) in
Experiment 1 and twenty-six in Experiment 2 (13 female; 18–32
years, mean age 23.4 years). The study was approved by the
Institute of Neurology (University College London) Research
Ethics Committee. Participants provided informed consent and
received reimbursement for their participation.
Stimuli
In each study stimuli consisted of 80 pictures of Converse shoes,
varying in colors and pattern but not model, brand or material.
The stimuli were presented in randomised order on a gray
background using Cogent 20002 running in MATLAB.
Procedure
Experiment 1
The study consisted of three consecutive sessions (Figure 1).
In session 1 (pre-manipulation stage, ∼20 min) and session 3
(post-manipulation stage, ∼30 min) participants were asked to
evaluate objects (shoes) while in an fMRI scanner. Session 2
(manipulation stage, ∼80 min) was conducted outside the
scanner, in which subjects created objects or watched objects
being created. Each session began with instructions and
example trials. Furthermore, subjects were supervised for at
least the first few test trials to ensure compliance with the
instructions.
Session 1 and 3 (Pre-Manipulation and
Post-Manipulation Sessions)
Before each session participants completed a number of training
trials. Each item (shoe) was presented for 2 s. Participants
were asked to advise the manufacturer at which price the
shoe should be sold to customer ‘‘Matt Brown’’ (as in Norton
et al., 2012) the task was to estimate the item’s worth to
‘‘an average Joe’’. This pricing procedure measures how an
individual estimate others will value an item. In other words,
we examine if participants believe even other people should
be willing to pay more for an item created by the participant.
Participants had up to 6 s to answer on a scale from £11 to
2www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent.php
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FIGURE 1 | Paradigm Experiment 1. (A) Session 1 (pre-manipulation) was conducted in the fMRI scanner. On each of the 80 trials participants were presented
with an image of a different Converse shoe and asked to key in their suggested retail price for that shoe using a button box. (B) Session 2 (manipulation session) was
performed on a computer outside the scanner. There were 40 create trials interleaved with 40 watch trials. On each create trial participants were given specific
instructions for creating one of the shoes presented in Session 1 (i.e., no customization allowed). The instructions were given as a series of colors and patterns that
indicated which color/pattern was to be chosen for each part of the shoe (there were nine parts including laces, outer body, heel, etc.). The participants created the
shoe on the Converse website (they were trained on creating shoes before they began) and clicked “save” when they were finished. On watch trials they viewed a
video that portrayed the shoe being created on the website. To make sure they attended, at the end of each watch trial they indicated whether a “tag” button was
clicked on the video. (C) Session 3 (post manipulation) was identical to Session 1, except that participants were also asked to indicate if they created the shoe in the
previous session, watched it being created, or did not know.
£88 using four button boxes in each hand (only eight buttons
were available, thus numbers 0 or 9 could not be used). A
fixation cross was then displayed for 1–3 s (jittered). In Session 3,
participants were also asked whether they previously created
or watched the shoe being created, or whether they don’t
know. Finally, a second fixation cross was displayed for 1–3 s
(jittered).
Session 2 (Manipulation-Session)
Session 2 was conducted using a computer outside the scanner.
There were 40 create trials interleaved with 40 watch trials.
The items presented were those viewed previously in Session 1
(allocation to condition was counterbalanced).
Watch Trials
On watch trials participants viewed pre-recorded videos of a
shoe being created on the Converse website. Thus, what the
participant viewed on screen was identical to what he/she
viewed on the computer screen while making a shoe themselves.
Participants were then asked to evaluate the shoe (as in
Session 1 and 3) and report whether or not the video
featured the removal of a ‘‘tag’’ on the shoe (this feature of
the shoe design is independent of the color). This question
ensured that participants attended to the videos (average
accuracy 91%).
Create Trials
On create trials participants created a shoe on the Converse
website according to specific instructions resulting in a
specific shoe. The instructions were presented as sequence
of colors/patterns that conveyed information about which
color/pattern each shoe part should be. In other words,
participants could not create shoes according to their own
preferences. Once the shoe was completed the participant
clicked ‘‘save’’. Participants were led to believe that the saved
stimuli would be used in Session 3. In fact, for simplicity,
identical stimuli saved previously by the experimenter were used.
Participants were then asked to value the shoe (as in Session 1
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 3 September 2015 | Volume 9 | Article 473
Koster et al. Beliefs about self-creation inflate value
FIGURE 2 | Paradigm Experiment 2—Belief manipulation. In order to manipulate subjects’ beliefs, rather than elicit them, we conducted a modified version of
the task. Session 1 (A) of Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1. However, in Session 2 (B) the display of the actual shoe was occluded such that subject’s
knowledge of which shoe was created and which was watched was more ambiguous and thus more easily manipulated. In Session 3 (C) before the shoe was
displayed, subjects were instructed whether the shoe was created or watched in Session 2; this information was false half of the time.
and 3). The actual price of the shoe displayed on the website was
occluded.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was identical to Experiment 1 except for the
following: (1) All parts of the study were conducted outside the
scanner; (2) The shoe was occluded during session 2 for both
create and watch trials; and (3) During session 3, participants
were informed whether they created or watched the shoe. The
information was false half the time. Specifically, the words ‘‘you
created’’ or ‘‘you watched’’ were displayed on screen for 2 s, then
a fixation cross (jittered for 1–3 s) was displayed followed by the
shoe image and the rating question.
Analysis of Behavioral Data
In both experiments, for each participant within each session
value ratings were z transformed (hereafter value) in order
to account for non-specific effects across sessions such as
participants becoming fatigued (see Sharot et al., 2009, 2010). The
transformed value represents the relative value of that stimulus
compared to all other stimuli for that participant in that session.
Note that the same results are found for untransformed data.
The change in value from Session 1 to Session 3 was then
calculated for each participant in each condition and entered
into a repeated measures ANOVA: 2 reality (watch/create) ×
2 belief (watch/create, by participants’ expression of belief in
Experiment 1 and instructed belief in Experiment 2). This
analysis was repeated with the initial values from session 1 in
order to examine dependence of initial value and later belief.
In Experiment 1, trials on which the participant responded
‘‘don’t know’’ in response to whether they created or watched
the shoe, and trials in which they did not enter a value in
the allotted 6 s, were removed from the analysis (six trials on
average). To investigate whether the RT of the belief question
was associated with the value change, the correlation between
measures was calculated within each participant. The average
correlation coefficient was tested against zero with a one-
sample t-test. The reaction times (RTs) to respond to the belief
question were analyzed in the same 2 × 2 ANOVA described
above.
MRI Scanning
The study was conducted at the Wellcome Trust Centre
for Neuroimaging at University College London using a 3T
Siemens Allegra scanner. Functional scans used a gradient
echo sequence optimised for orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala
coverage (Weiskopf et al., 2007). Time of repetition (TR) =
2.52 s, time of echo (TE) = 30 ms, flip angle (FA) = 90◦,
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matrix = 64 × 64, field of view (FOV) = 192 × 192 mm2,
slice thickness = 2 mm. Forty two axial slices (–30◦ tilt) were
sampled for whole brain coverage, in-plane resolution = 3 ×
3 mm. An MPRAGE sequence was used to acquire structural
images after session 3 which comprised 1-mm-thick axial slices
parallel to the anterior commissure/posterior commissure
plane. Imaging data were analyzed with SPM5 (Wellcome
Trust Centre for Neuroimaging). Images were realigned with
the first volume (after discarding six dummy volumes) and
unwarped, normalized to the the Montreal Neurological
Institute reference template, resampled to 2 × 2 × 2 mm3
voxels, and spatially smoothed (8 mm full width at
half-maximum).
Analysis of fMRI Data
For each participant a time series was created indicating the
temporal position of: (1) Display of stimuli (shoes); (2) Motor
responses; (3) Onset of the rating question; and (4) Fixation.
These were modeled as time periods of 2, 0, 0, and the specific
duration of each fixation period (average 2 s, respectively. In
addition, a parametric modulator containing the z-transformed
value rating was entered modulating the time period of shoe
presentation. Time periods were convolved with the canonical
hemodynamic response function. Motion correction regressors
were entered as covariates of no interest.
The general linear model (GLM) of the third session was
identical to session 1 above, but in addition it contained
the onset of the belief question with three parametric
modulators; (1) Distinguishing accurate from inaccurate belief;
(2) Distinguishing participants’ belief of whether they created or
watched the shoe being created; and (3) Distinguishing shoes that
were in reality created from watched.
In order to identify regions that were activated at the
time of the belief question activity during the time of belief
question was contrasted against fixation (p < 0.05, FWE
cluster level corrected after voxel-wise thresholding at p <
0.001, see Sharot et al., 2004, 2007b, for a similar procedure).
Four regions emerged: left amygdala, left hippocampus, left
and right occipital lobe, and right insula. To allow precise
localisation of activation in the amygdala and hippocampus we
constrained emerging voxels using anatomical masks via the
WFU PickAtlas toolbox (Lancaster et al., 2000; Maldjian et al.,
2003). We identified regions where BOLD signal correlated
with item value using a parametric modulation analysis (value
modulating the time period of shoe presentation) over both
sessions (p < 0.05, FWE cluster level corrected after voxelwise
thresholding at p < 0.001). Here, the caudate nucleus was
of specific interest as it has previously been shown to be
involved in value change due to action related to the self (Sharot
et al., 2009, 2010) enabling on a priori grounds to use small
volume correction for anatomically defined right and left caudate
nucleus.
We implemented a second GLM to allow a 2 reality
(watch/create) × 2 belief (watch/create) ANOVA. This was
identical to the first GLM except that the item presentation
and belief question were divided into five different conditions:
Items that were; (1) Created and believed to be created
(created-created); (2) Created and believed to have been watched
(created-watched); (3) Watched and believed to be created
(watched- created); (4) Watched and believed to be watched
(watched- watched); and (5) Items for which the participant
indicated they ‘‘don’t know’’. Each presentation condition
contained a parametric modulator containing the z-transformed
rating. Additionally, in Session 3 another parametric modulator
was included containing the z-transformed rating change.
For each participant the average beta estimates over all voxels
during the shoe representation, in each of the four critical
conditions, in each session, was calculated for the regions of
interest (ROIs) identified in the first step of the analysis (those
regions significantly more active during belief expression vs.
fixation, and regions tracking value). Then the change in average
betas between Session 1 and 3 was calculated and entered into a 2
reality (watch/create) × 2 belief (watch/create) ANOVA (using
the change in betas as a dependent variable is equivalent to
adding an additional ‘‘session’’ factor to the ANOVA with two
levels). Average betas over all voxels in each of the ROIs were
also calculated for the four critical conditions during the belief
question presentation in Session 3. These were entered into a 2
reality (watch/create) × 2 belief (watch/create) ANOVA. Note
that the identification of ROIs is completely independent from
follow up ANOVAs. A psycho-physiological interaction (PPI)
analysis was conducted to investigate the connectivity between
the ROIs during the two sessions.
Functional Connectivity Analysis
In the first model, a PPI analysis was conducted to examine
functional coupling between regions showing significant effects
in the first analysis (i.e., the ‘‘seeds’’; amygdala, hippocampus,
insula) and those tracking value (i.e., the ‘‘targets’’; caudate and
inferior frontal gyrus, IFG) before and after the manipulation
session at the time of shoe presentation. Three PPIs were
implemented (i.e., one for each seed) where the regressors
included: (1) The activation time course of the volume of interest
(i.e., physiological variable); (2) A regressor representing the
psychological variable of interest (the time of item presentation);
and (3) A regressor representing the cross product of the previous
two (the psychophysiological interaction term, PPI). The first
two regressors were added as covariates to the model whilst the
last regressor was of interest. For each participant, we extracted
the parameter estimates of the PPI regressor for each of the
target ROIs for the pre and post-manipulation sessions. Then
we conducted paired t-tests to investigate if the functional
connectivity has changed between the pre and post-manipulation
sessions (Bonferroni corrected for six comparisons). In order
to show that a change was not due to a general increase
in connectivity over time, we conducted the same analysis
on the whole time course of the scans (as in Sharot et al.,
2010).
Results
Subjective Belief, Objective Reality and Value
Participants valued items more after the manipulation stage
relative to before if they believed they created the item
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themselves, and this was the case whether this belief was veridical
or not. Specifically, entering value change (rating of value after
manipulation minus rating before) into a 2 (subjective belief:
created/watch) by 2 (objective reality: create/watch) ANOVA
revealed a main effect of subjective belief (F1,18 = 6.522,
p < 0.05, with no effect of reality or interaction of reality
and belief). The effect remains also after z-transforming the
data within each session in order to remove non-specific
session effects like fatigue and reduced attention over time
(F1,18 = 10.07, p < 0.01; Figure 3). The increase in value
after the manipulation session was significant for items the
participants actually created and correctly believed they created
(t18 = 2.3, p < 0.05), but equally so for items participants had
watched being created but then falsely believed they had created
(t18 = 2.6, p< 0.05). There was no main effect of objective reality
(F1,18 = 0.18, p = 0.68), indicating that whether participants
created an item or watched it being created was not related
to value change. We observed no interaction (F1,18 = 1.42,
p = 0.25) such that belief accuracy (i.e., whether participants’
belief matched reality) was not related to value change. Thus,
creation per se was not associated with participants’ evaluation,
whereas subjective belief in having created an item enhanced
value.
Participants were instructed to press ‘‘create’’ and ‘‘watch’’
only if they had a sense that they created the item or watched
it being created, otherwise they should press the ‘‘don’t know’’
button, which they did 7% of the trials. The task was designed
to induce a large number of false responses so that belief could
be dissociated from reality. Indeed, out of the trials in which
participants indicated their beliefs, they were inaccurate on 47.5%
of the trials. To assure subjects’ were not randomly pressing
buttons we compared the rate of the three types of responses to
chance. All were significantly different from chance (‘‘created’’:
t18 = 5.09, p < 0.001; ‘‘watched’’: t18 = 6.05, p < 0.001; ‘‘don’’t
know’: t18 = 10.12, p < 0.001, chance level at 33%). Together,
these results suggest that subjects were complying with the
instruction to indicate a belief. We emphasize that these beliefs
do not need to indicate a true memory.
Did Participants’ Belief in having Created an Item
Enhance the Item’s Value or did Participants
Simply Believe They Created Objects They
Valued Highly?
Examining subjects’ initial rating of items in Rating Session 1
did not reveal an effect of belief, reality, nor an interaction (all
p > 0.17). In other words, while the value of items they believed
to have created was enhanced following our experimental
manipulation, these were not the items they initially rated highly.
Could random increases in value over the two sessions trigger a
belief that these items were created? To test this possibility, we
conducted a second experiment on a new set of participants, in
which we actively manipulated participants’ beliefs rather than
assessed them.
Tomanipulate participants’ beliefs, we altered the task slightly
so that veridical recollection of actual creation of an item
was even less likely than in Experiment 1. Specifically, we
FIGURE 3 | Subjective belief, not objective reality, is related to value.
Change in the value participants assigned to items (price post-manipulation
minus price pre-manipulation) was greater for shoes participants believed they
had created than shoes they believed they had watched being created.
Whether participants in fact created or watched the shoe being created had
no effect on value change. A positive score represents an increase in
subjective value after the manipulation session relative to before. Error bars
show within-subject standard error of the mean (Cousineau, 2005).
occluded the shoe during the manipulation session on both
creation trials and watch trials (see ‘‘"Materials and Methods’’
Section for details). Participants could still create the shoes
as before, by clicking the correct button on the color panels
that described the shoes design, and watch the creation process
by observing the button being clicked. However, without
observing the shoes during this stage it was more difficult
for participants to form veridical beliefs of which shoe was
created and which was watched. In the final session, participants
were told before viewing each shoe whether they created the
shoe (‘‘you created’’) or whether they watched it being created
(‘‘you watched’’). Crucially, this information was false half of
the time, allowing us to experimentally dissociate belief from
actuality and test the causal impact of belief on value. The
results of Experiment 2 revealed a main effect of instructed belief
on value change (F1,25 = 4.23, p = 0.05), participants valued
shoes more after they were told they had created them relative
to before. There was no main effect of reality (i.e., whether
the shoe was actually created or watched did not affect value,
F1,25 = 0.01, p = 0.97) and no interaction (i.e., whether the
instruction matched reality did not affect value, F1,25 = 2.27,
p = 0.14).
After the final part of Experiment 2, participants completed a
short questionnaire consisting of five questions probing whether
they had any suspicion that the information displayed to them
was random. The questions were ‘‘funnelled’’ to get increasingly
more sensitive and suggestive of the fact that the displayed
information was random. We used the final, most sensitive
question (‘‘In fact the information was wrong half of the time,
did you notice that?’’) to split the sample into subjects with
no suspicions at all and subjects with any suspicion at all. The
debriefing questionnaire showed that 10 of 26 subjects had
some suspicion that the given information (‘‘you watched’’/’’you
created’’) was random. This number is similar to previous studies
using deception (Edelson et al., 2011, 2015). Examining data of
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subjects who reported no suspicion strengthened our results:
effect of belief: F1,15 = 8.19, p = 0.01, with no effect of reality:
F1,15 = 0.36, p = 0.56 and no interaction: F1,15 = 2.25, p = 0.15.
This suggests that participants in the task did not just associate
the shoes they liked with themselves, but that believing they had
a hand in creation enhanced perceived value.
Together these results suggest that overvaluation of self-
created items is a reconstructive process which is contingent on
a belief in having been the author of the creation.
fMRI Results
The behavioral results revealed a relationship between explicit
belief and valuation, leading us to use fMRI data to characterise
brainmechanismsmediating this link. To do so we first identified
BOLD signals associated with subjective belief and veridical
representations of reality and then identified BOLD signal that
tracked value. After these regions were identified, we asked the
critical question of how these types of signals relate to each other
after the creation manipulation.
Representation of Belief and Reality
First, to identify brain regions engaged at the time of belief
expression we used an approach employed by us previously
(Sharot et al., 2004, 2007b); conducting a broad search for
any voxels where activity was significantly enhanced at the
time participants indicated their belief (over all trials) relative
to all fixation (p < 0.05, FWE cluster corrected). Significant
effects were observed in four regions; the left amydgala (MNI
coordinates of peak value, 16 4 −16, k = 155; Figure 4A), right
insula (34 −18 18, k = 226), left hippocampus (−22 −32 −4,
k = 618; Figure 4B) and bilateral occipital lobe (−10 −94 −12,
k = 7453).
We then set out to identify which of the three regions was
signaling belief, which reality and which accurate recollection
(i.e., where belief matched reality). Note, that this approach
allows definition of the function of each ROI within our specific
task and data thus we do not need to rely on reverse inference
(we do not examine occipital lobe further as activity here is likely
related to visual activation, see Wandell et al., 2007).
As our main behavioral finding showed that belief in creation
was associated with an enhancement in value assigned to an
object following the manipulation, we first examined for parallel
changes in BOLD activity by estimating the change in average
beta (after manipulation—before manipulation) for each subject
across all voxels, for each condition and region, during object
presentation. These were entered into a 2 (belief: created/watch)
FIGURE 4 | Representation of subjective belief, veridical belief and value in the amygdala, hippocampus and caudate. Regions in which the BOLD
response was significantly enhanced during belief expression relative to fixation included the (A) left amygdala and (B) left hippocampus (all p < 0.05, cluster level
corrected). (C) During item presentation change in BOLD response during session 3 (post-manipulation) relative to session 1 (pre-manipulation) averaged across the
voxels in the left amygdala was greater during presentations of shoes participants believed they created relative to shoes they believed they watched. (D) In contrast,
BOLD response during belief expression across the voxels in the left hippocampus was greater during trials in which participants gave an accurate response
(veridical belief of whether they created the shoe) relative to trials in which they gave an incorrect belief judgment. (E) BOLD response in the right caudate nucleus
during shoe presentation over both sessions correlates with the value participants assigned to the shoes (p < 0.05 FWE, small volume corrected). Error bars show
within subject standard error of the mean (Cousineau, 2005).
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by 2 (reality: create/watch) ANOVA. The analysis revealed a
main effect of belief in left amygdala (F1,18 = 4.49, p < 0.05)
and an effect of reality in insula (F1,18 = 8.06, p < 0.05).
Specifically, change in activity across sessions in the amygdala
was significantly greater for items believed to have been created
relative to items believed to have been watched (Figure 4C).
In the insula activity changes across sessions was significantly
reduced for items participants watched being created relative to
those they had themselves created.
There were no significant changes in left hippocampal activity
across sessions. What then was the function of the hippocampus
in this task? We tested if BOLD activity in the hippocampus was
related to belief accuracy during the time of belief expression.
Indeed, this was evident in a significant interaction between belief
and reality (F1,18 = 4.73, p < 0.05). As displayed in Figure 4,
we observed greater activity in the hippocampus for trials where
belief matched reality (i.e., trials that were created and believed
to be created and trials that were watched and believed to have
been watched) than for trials where belief was false (Figure 4D).
This suggest that there was a trace of accurate (possibly implicit)
memory, a notion that was supported by analysis of RTs.
Interestingly, participants’ implicit responses in Experiment 1
reflected a trace of veridical reality. Specifically, entering the time
it took (reaction time/RT) participants to indicate their belief of
having created or watched the item being created into a 2 (belief:
created/watched) by 2 (reality: create/watched) ANOVA revealed
a main effect of reality (F1,18 = 4.86, p < 0.05). Participants
were slower to respond when presented with items they created
compared to those they watched, regardless of explicit belief.
These longer RTs may reflect a greater amount of information
retrieval for created items—such as past processing of creation
instructions. Importantly, this implicit representation of reality
was not related to value change (there was no correlation between
value change and RT; across participants average r = −0.02,
t18 = 0.48, p = 0.64) and RT were dissociated from participants’
explicit response as evident by the fact that there was no
main effect of belief on RT and no interaction between belief
and reality on RT. This result is consistent with previous
results demonstrating dissociations between implicit behavior
and explicit responses, with the former providing more accurate
indication of past occurrences (Hannula and Ranganath, 2009).
This first part of the analysis was successful in identifying the
regions were activity was related to belief and reality. We thus
turned to the crucial question of how these representations relate
to changes in value signal.
Relationship between Value, Belief, and Reality
To index regions tracking value we conducted a parametric
modulation analysis across all trials in both sessions to identify
voxels where activity correlated with participants’ rating of value.
This revealed activity during item presentation in right caudate
nucleus (a-priori ROI, FWE small volume corrected p< 0.05; 20,
18, 10; k = 11; Figure 4E) and left IFG (−52, 14, 2; FWE cluster
corrected p< 0.05, k = 305) correlating with participants’ ratings
of value. No other regions in the brain showed a significant effect;
we emphasize that neither amygdala, insula nor hippocampus
activity tracked value.
Next, we examine how activity in the regions tracking
value (i.e., caudate and IFG) relates to activity associated
with subjective belief, reality and veridical belief (amygdala,
insula, and hippocampus). We assessed changes in functional
connectivity between regions mediating these processes during
item representation after the manipulation stage relative to
before. Psychophysical interaction analysis (Figure 5A) revealed
a significant increase in functional connectivity between the
amygdala and caudate after the manipulation phase relative to
before (Figure 5B; t18 = 3.22, p < 0.05, Bonferroni corrected for
six multiple comparisons between the two ROIs indexing value,
and the three ROIs related to belief expression). This increase
was specific to the time of object presentation, and not to the
entire time-course of the BOLD response (t18 = 0.18, p = 0.89).
There were no other significant effects. These results mirror our
behavioral findings, which indicate that subjective belief, not
reality per se, is associated with value following creation.
Discussion
Our results demonstrate that when people create items they come
to overvalue their creations. These errors in judgement could
have societal impact, as individuals and groups may come to
overvalue inferior projects and ideas in sectors ranging from
business to health. Our results reveal a psychological and system
level mechanism by which such valuation interacts with belief
of self-creations. The data shows that overvaluation of self-
creations is not contingent on customization of items (see also
Norton et al., 2012), as our experimental design does not allow
participants to customize items according to their individual
preferences. Nor is it contingent on becoming familiar with
the process by which an item is created, as our experimental
design allows participants to observe the creation process in
both ‘‘watch’’ and ‘‘create’’ conditions. In fact, our findings
show that overvaluation is not even contingent on actually
having created the item. Rather, such overvaluation appears to
be a reconstructive process that can be manipulated, resulting
in participants quickly re-evaluating items once they come to
believe they have created them, whether that belief is true or
false.
FIGURE 5 | Relationship between representations of value, belief, and
reality. (A) Depiction of functional ROIs of the left hippocampus, left amygdala
and right caudate. (B) PPI beta estimates reveal that functional connectivity
from pre-manipulation session to post-manipulation session is increased
between the left amygdala and right caudate. Error bars show within subject
standard error of the mean (Cousineau, 2005).
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Participants did not simply believe they created objects
they value more as evidenced by: (1) the initial value of
objects participants subsequently believe to have created was
not higher than those they subsequently believe they had
watched being created; and (2) instructing participants on which
objects they had created and which they had watched being
created. In sum, people’s belief about their self-creation actions
in the past, rather than objective reality, was a significant
contributor to shaping value. This was true irrespective of
whether participants’ beliefs were elicited or manipulated, and
suggests that actual effort need not be invested in an object
for its subjective value to increase. This, however, is not to say
that investing effort may not enhance value even further. The
dependence on retrospective and explicit belief, independent
of reality, is a novel insight into the nature of overvaluation.
Using brain imaging, we identify BOLD signals that relate
to subjective value and subjective belief in this task. This
approach allows definition of the function of each ROI within
our specific task and thereby obviates the need to rely on
reverse inference. We reveal increased functional connectivity
between these signals following the creation manipulation.
Specifically, following creation, participants’ explicit beliefs about
the prior occurrence of the creation event were associated
with alteration of left amygdala activity. The association
between amygdala activity and subjective belief is consistent
with previous reports suggesting that activity in the amygdala
signals subjective aspects of recollection, such as vividness or
confidence, that can be dissociated from reality (Sharot et al.,
2004; Dolcos et al., 2005; Edelson et al., 2011). Importantly,
amygdala activity not only varied according to subjective
belief, but was increasingly correlated with activity in the right
caudate, which tracked the value of items. This correlation
was seen only after the manipulation session, when belief
of self-creation interacted with evaluation, and this linkage
was not evident before. The involvement of the caudate in
tracking value in this context is of interest as it aligns with
evidence that this region is involved in the representation
of a goal based value (Wunderlich et al., 2012), consistent
with the inferential nature of the processing required in
our task.
Amygdala activity is often dissociated from the pattern of
activity observed in adjacent hippocampus (Sharot et al., 2004;
Dolcos et al., 2005; Kensinger, 2009) and surrounding cortices
(Sharot et al., 2004, 2007a). Such dissociations are observed
when emotional and/or motivational factors alter subjective
aspects of recollection independently of the accuracy of the
judgment (Sharot et al., 2004, 2007a; Dolcos et al., 2005; Edelson
et al., 2011). Here, while amygdala activity reflected participants’
beliefs, heightened activity in the left hippocampus was only
observed when participants provided accurate belief judgements.
This signal did not show enhanced functional connectivity with
a caudate value signal, consistent with the fact that accuracy
of beliefs did not drive value. In future work, investigation of
the relative involvement of the amygdala’s subregions could
be of interest, due to their varied projections and involvement
in decision-making (Boureau and Dayan, 2011). Furthermore,
using this design with different stimuli will enable to generalize
the findings to other types of creation. Our investigation shows
that subjective belief can be closely associated with preference,
even in situations where those beliefs are false. In this context,
the amygdala and dorsal sectors of the striatum appear to play
a key role in mediating an interaction between preference and
belief. Our neural results suggest overvaluation due to creation is
a process that integrates subjective belief into value judgements
as the judgement is being made. These results provide a possible
mechanism by which false beliefs can alter human evaluation,
potentially leading to errors in judgment.
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